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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [MASS](#) [PREL](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: Country Team Assessment for Transfer Advanced Anti-Radiation
Guided Missile (AARGM).

CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD G. OLSON, JR, AMBASSADOR; REASON: 1.4(A), (B),
(C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: (u) Country Team Assessment for Transfer Advanced
Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM).

Ref: (u) Ref A UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/112 dated 27 Jan 09
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case
AE-P-AAM. Ref B. UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/113 dated 27 Jan 09
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case
AE-P-AAM. Ref C UAE letter dp/c-10/99/05/04/116 dated 6 April 2009
Subj: classified secret briefing request for HARM FMS case
AE-P-AAM.

[1](#)1. (u) Classified by Ambassador Richard G. Olson, reasons 1.4
(a), (b), and (d).

[1](#)2. (u) Summary. The armed forces of the United Arab Emirates requested a LOA for the transfer of advanced anti radiation guided missiles (AARGM) to consider for purchase. The AARGM transforms the agm-88 harm from a single function Suppression-of-Enemy-Air-Defense (SEAD) role to a multi-mission weapon capable of both Destruction-of-Enemy-Air-Defense (DEAD) and strike capabilities. The weapon consists of the following: autonomous emitter detection and id, autonomous target geolocation, versatile dual mode seeker, lethal active terminal guidance, gps/ins precision with collateral damage control capability, and data-link support for battle damage assessment. AARGM provides a lethal capability against current and projected integrated air defenses and time critical strike targets. The weapon complement other U.S. systems the UAE has or is currently acquiring. The system requested would be employed from F-16 block 60 aircraft, which currently use the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) missile, operated by the UAE.

13. (u) The following country team assessment is provided in support of the UAE request for AARGM missiles, associated equipment, and training. This assessment supports the release of the full capability of the system to the UAE to include the ability to engage the maximum number of threats releasable to foreign AARGM partners. The UAE has not requested a quantity, but two-hundred (200) has been mentioned.

a. (c) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services. The UAE views this system as a crucial requirement to defend its military and civilian air, sea, and ground assets and critical infrastructure in the event of an attack by enemy forces. The AARGM provides superior destruction of enemy air defenses capability above the legacy High speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) system currently in the UAE inventory. It will provide a significant improvement to the UAE capability when combined with the F-16 block 60 aircraft in support of allied operations. The intended users of AARGM will be the UAE Air Force and Air Defense.

b. (c) How the articles or services would affect the recipient's force structure. AARGM is anticipated to be fielded with significant improvement in capability but have minimal effect on force structure. It will compliment or replace the UAE

inventory of HARM.

c. (c) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals. The AARGM is a logical addition to the existing defense systems that UAE has been operating for several years and is procuring. AARGM is interoperable with U.S. equipment. It would have the immediate ability to augment U.S. actions in the region by bolstering defense for co-located U.S. and UAE forces at Al Dhafra, Minhad, and Fujairah Air Bases and at the ports of Jebal Ali and Fujairah. UAE Special Operations Forces also serve alongside U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. AARGM missiles would serve to minimize collateral damage compared to HARM. AARGM will enhance overall defense capability in the GCC Region.

d. (c) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested. The UAE has not submitted an LOR specifically requesting a quantity. Based on discussion with us industry, the UAE may request two hundred (200) AARGM missiles, associated equipment, and training. This is justified by the number of critical locations that are in the United Arab Emirates.

The country team supports this transfer request as appropriate based on the threat and the defensive cover the UAE could provide.

e. (c) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new warfighting capability to the nation or region. As the CENTCOM representative, USLO concurs with the introduction of this capability to UAE. The AARGM would bolster UAE defense and that of co-located U.S. Forces in the UAE. The AARGM capability would be a useful compliment for CENTCOM CONPLANS.

f. (c) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations. As this represents a defensive system, there are no anticipated reactions from neighboring nations.

g. (c) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles. Having signed a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA signed in 2001), a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA signed in 1987), and a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case for U.S. communication security custodians, the UAE has the required agreements and doctrine in place for the security of U.S. classified material. The UAE continues to demonstrate its capability to provide the required security for classified items released to the UAE. It is anticipated that the UAE will continue to provide the required level of security and maintenance for these articles. Early trends are developing with regard to timely payments, LOA processing, and response to vital program management correspondence that would indicate the UAE is having difficulty handling the exponential FMS program growth. While the situation is under control at this time there is potential to degrade the FMS program at large if trends worsen. The UAE is aware of these issues and has the resources within its control to address them.

h. (u) Training required either in-country or in the united states and anticipated restrictions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country. Specialized training either in country or in the U.S. is estimated to be minimal, but some specialized

training will be required to fully utilize the AARGM's capability. AARGM is an upgrade to the HARM system. Since the UAE is already a HARM user it is anticipated that only 3 U.S. personnel will be required for two years for the implementation of the AARGM system. These three would be trainers and as trainers would operate under the United States Embassy chief mission. This is not anticipated to generate an adverse reaction. The in-country trainers will require NSDD-38 authorization and ICASS support (basic package and housing pool at a minimum). The Ambassador shall remain the authority for NSDD-38 decisions. The AARGM in conjunction with the UAE's additional procurements cannot be supported within the existing U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Approving this system is contingent upon further interagency progress on creating a new platform to support expanded defense cooperation programs.

i. (u) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article. In concert with other programs at or near implementation there will be additional U.S. presence in country. Several technical representatives may be required on a TDY basis to implement and sustain this case. It is not anticipated that there will be a significant level of in-country U.S. presence caused by incorporation of the AARGM alone.

j. (u) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition. This transfer will be funded by a FMS, DCS or a hybrid case and there is no anticipated economic impact to the UAE. While not untouched by the global economic downturn, the UAE is still able to fund major civil and defense projects and purchases. The UAE FMS Management shortfalls may soon necessitate that they direct and fund a reasonable increase for management. The UAE is a cash customer.

k (u) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. There are no human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition.

l. (u) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced war fighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance verification. End use monitoring (EUM) and compliance verification will be conducted in accordance with current regulations,

directives, and guidelines. USLO UAE currently has an end use monitoring program in place with the UAE armed forces which includes AIM-120 AMRAAM and RGM-84 Harpoon Block II missiles previously acquired by the UAE. This acquisition would increase the number of EUM items for accountability. The USLO is at the minimum manning level needed to conduct effective EUM.

m. (c) Recommendations whether the USG should approve transfer of the article and justification. The country team recommends that the acquisition of the AARGM be approved. Consideration should be given to requiring additional UAE funded management for this case and the group of cases related to air defense that are about to be implemented. If unwilling to demand a UAE-funded improvement, then a U.S. funded improvement is highly recommended to preserve program integrity and the us relationship with the UAE. AARGM is a logical addition to the existing and planned improvements to the UAE defensive structure. The U.S. operates extensively from UAE ports and air fields and would receive the immediate benefit of this defense system as a result.

14. (c) The country team supports the UAE request for transfer of AARGM and associated items named in the request. The country team recommends that the release of this system be completed in order to augment the UAE with the introduction of its defense system.

15. (u) USLO primary point of contact is LtCol Jeff Hancock, USMC. Comm tel: 971 (2) 414-2504, STE III: 971 (2) 414-2382, siprnet hancocjg@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil . Alternate contact Maj Troy Alexander, USA. Comm tel: 971 (2) 414-2637, STE III: 971 (2) 414-2382, siprnet alexandertv@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil . Cpt Mathew Paulick, USA. Comm tel: 971 (2) 414-2298, STE III: 971 (2) 414-2308, siprnet paulicmh@uaesao.centcom.smil.mil.
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